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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction 
over final formal agency decisions of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. (hereinafter, U.C.A.) § 78-2-
2(3) (e) (ii) (1953), .as amended. The Utah Supreme Court may, in 
its discretion, transfer a case pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(4) to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Utah State Tax Commission erred 
when it determined that Petitioners/ 
Appellees, as husband and wife, were entitled 
to two primary residential property tax 
exemptions based upon its definition and 
interpretation of "Household" and "Domicile?" 
Standard of Review: The determination of this issue is a 
mixed question of fact and law. On questions of fact, this Court 
grants the Tax Commission deference concerning its written 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on 
review. On questions of law, this Court grants the Tax 
Commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a "correction of error standard." U.C.A. § 59-1-610. 
This issue was preserved before the Utah State Tax 
Commission by its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Decision, dated May 22, 2003. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. U.C.A. § 59-2-103(2). (Addendum A). 
2. U.C.A. § 59-2-102(27). (Addendum B). 
3. Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52. (Addendum C). 
4. U.C.A. § 59-2-1202. (Addendum D). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bradley and Jillian Scott, as husband and wife, own two 
residential homes, one in Park City, Utah, which was purchased in 
1989, and the other in Salt Lake City, Utah, which was purchased 
in 1999. The Scotts have four children. 
During the school year, Jillian Scott and the four children 
live in the Salt Lake City home, although they commute on 
weekends to the Park City home. Bradley Scott lives in the Salt 
Lake City home for two nights a week during the school year. 
During the school vacations, the entire family lives at the Park 
City home. 
By mutual agreement between the Salt Lake County and Summit 
County Assessors, the Salt Lake City home was accorded the 
"primary" residential property tax exemption. The Park City home 
was treated as a "secondary" residence. The Scott's appealed 
this decision to the Summit County Board of Equalization, which 
upheld the Summit County Assessor's determination. 
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The Scott's then appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Commission reversed the Summit County Board of Equalization, 
finding that the Scott's qualified for two "primary" residential 
property tax exemptions. 
The Summit County Board of Equalization filed its appeal to 
this Court on June 20, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Bradley and Jillian Scott are married and have four 
children. 
2. Bradley and Jillian Scott have owned a residence at 8200 
Royal Street in Park City since 1989. However, the Scott family 
lived in California until 1997. 
3. In 1997, Jillian Scott and the four children moved to the 
Park City residence. Bradley Scott remained in California until 
1998 to resolve his business affairs. 
4. In 1999, the Scotts purchased another residence at 1101 N. 
Oak Forest Road in Salt Lake City. 
5. The Scotts' four children attend a private school in Salt 
Lake City. 
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6. Jillian Scott and the children spend four nights a week at 
the Salt Lake City home to allow the children to attend school 
during the week. They spend three nights a week at the Park 
City home. School vacations are spent at the Park City home. 
7. Bradley Scott spends five nights a week at the Park City 
home and two nights a week at the Salt Lake City home. 
8. Both the Park City and Salt Lake City homes have similar 
square footage and are fully furnished. 
9. Salt Lake County has granted the Scotts a primary 
residential property tax exemption on their residence in Salt 
Lake County. 
10. The Scotts have listed the Park City home as their Federal 
Income Tax filing address. 
11. Bradley Scotts Driver's License and Library Card show his 
Park City address. However, he is registered to vote in Salt 
Lake City and maintains an office in Salt Lake City at 9 Exchange 
Place. All mail for his Park City home is mailed to his Salt 
Lake City office. Mail is also received in his Salt Lake City 
home. 
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12. The Scotts' church records are located in a Park City 
church. However, they bank in Salt Lake City. The Scotts' motor 
vehicles are registered in both Park City and Salt Lake City. 
13. The Scott's children attend school and participate in sports 
in Salt Lake City. 
14. Based upon the grant of "primary residence" in Salt Lake 
County, Summit County listed the Scotts' Park City home as a 
"secondary residence." 
15. The Scotts appealed this to the Utah State Tax Commission, 
which found in their favor, granting in essence two (2) primary 
residential tax exemptions, one in Park City and another in Salt 
Lake City. Summit County appeals from that decision. (Utah 
State Tax Commission, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decision, dated May 22, 2003, attached hereto as Addendum 
E) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The People of the State of Utah through its Constitution and 
Legislature have provided a property tax exemption for primary 
residential homes. The intent is to provide a household or 
family with a property tax exemption for its primary residence. 
In this case, the intent of both the Utah Constitution and 
the Utah Code to provide for a primary residential property tax 
exemption has been turned on its head by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. The Scotts are a family, one household. They share 
furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses in two 
homes. However, the Utah State Tax Commission, in a twisted 
strain of logic has decided that this really isn't just one 
family, its two. One household lives in Salt Lake City part of 
the year and the other household lives in Park City part of the 
year. As a result, one family has two primary residences, two 
domiciles, co-existing at the same time and in the same State. 
Appellant entreats this Court to clarify the definitions of 
"domicile" and "household" as applied to the Scotts and other 
applicants for the primary residential property tax exemption in 
Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
Whether the Utah State Tax Commission erred 
when it determined that Petitioners/ 
Appellees, as husband and wife, were entitled 
to two primary residential property tax 
exemptions based upon its definition and 
interpretation of "Household" and "Domicile?" 
Prior Practice of the Utah Tax Commission. 
The Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") determined 
that the Scotts were entitled to two primary residential property 
tax exemptions, one in Park City and the other in Salt Lake City. 
This is a 180 degree departure from the position which the 
Commission had taken since the inception of the exemption. Just 
two years ago in Black v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, Appeal No. 02-0598 (Tax Commission 2001) (see Addendum 
F), the Commission had taken the opposite position in a case of 
co-habitation where the man and woman kept different homes, one 
in Salt Lake County and the other in Summit County. The Tax 
Commission determined that they were still only one "household" 
for purposes of the primary residential property tax exemption. 
The Commission found this in spite of the fact that most of the 
man's property was in Summit County, he spent most nights at the 
Summit County home, he was registered to vote in Summit County, 
and he paid no utility bills for the Salt Lake County home. This 
decision of the Tax Commission is consistent with an October 16, 
1997 Advisory Opinion, where the Commission opined 
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The only distinctions that we have drawn with 
regard to a property owner who owns two homes 
in Utah are as follows: 
(1) If the property owner is a Utah 
resident, but neither of the homes is rented 
or leased for use as a primary residence to 
another party. In that case, we assume that 
the owner is using one home as a primary 
residence and the other as a secondary 
residence. 
(2) If the property owner is not a Utah 
resident, but owns residential property in 
Utah, we assume that the owner is using the 
Utah property as secondary property unless 
the owner shows that it is being used as a 
primary residence. (See Dennis v. Summit 
County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 1997), copy 
enclosed.) 
(October 16, 1997 Advisory Opinion Letter, herein attached at 
Addendum G ) . Again, this is consistent with the Tax Commission's 
prior practice. In Hadley v. County Board of Equalization of 
Washington County, Appeal No. 94-2128 (Tax Commission 1994) (see 
Addendum H ) , a husband and wife owned one home in St. George and 
another in Salt Lake City. The husband spent most of his time in 
the St. George residence, while the wife spent most of her time 
in the Salt Lake City residence. In finding that the couple was 
entitled to only one primary residential property tax exemption, 
the Commission held: 
In the instant case Petitioner seeks to 
divide the primary residential property 
characteristics between a husband and wife. 
This practice would allow a husband and wife 
to have separate primary residences and 
thwart the intent of statute. 
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In reversing its prior longstanding position, the Commission 
has gutted the intent of the statute and is now relying upon new 
interpretations of the Code and its own rules without adequate 
notice to the taxing authorities. 
The Law 
The Utah Legislature granted a residential property tax 
exemption of 45% to Utah residents. U.C.A. § 59-2-103(2). In 
doing so, the Legislature specifically defined what it meant by 
"residential." 
"Residential property," for the purposes of 
the reductions and adjustments under this 
chapter, means any property used for 
residential purposes as a primary residence. 
. . . (emphasis added). 
U.C.A. § 59-2-102(27). The Utah State Tax Commission's rules 
further refine "primary residence" to be where one has 
established domicile. R884-24-52(B). The Commission has also 
determined that given the intent of the Legislature, only one 
exemption is available for each "household." R884-24-52(B). 
"Household" is a defined term by the Legislature. 
"Household" means the association of persons 
who live in the same dwelling, sharing its 
furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and 
expenses. 
U.C.A. § 59-2-1202(4). 
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Application to Appellees 
Here, the Scotts are a family consisting of a 
husband/father, wife/mother, and four children. The evidence is 
that the family lives at various times of the year in two 
dwellings, one in Salt Lake City and the other in Park City. In 
so doing, the family shares the same "furnishings, facilities, 
[and] accommodations" in both locations. Both homes are similar 
in size. The "expenses" for both homes come out of the exact 
same family budget, as Bradley Scott has all of the bills sent to 
his office in Salt Lake City. It is a twisting of the term 
"household" to suggest that the husband is a household unto 
himself in Park City, and the wife and children are a separate 
and distinct household unto themselves in Salt Lake City when 
they are the same family. 
The Commission has misinterpreted the term "household" by 
confusing it with "domicile." By finding that the father's 
"domicile" is separate from the rest of the family, the 
Commission has divorced the father from his "household." In so 
doing, the fact that the Scott family is a family unit or one 
"household," which happens to use two residences, gets lost in 
the mix. 
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Public Policy Implications. 
The consequences of the Tax Commission's new found ruling is 
disastrous for localities which have large populations of second 
homes, like Summit County, Washington County and Rich County. 
What is to prevent families who live in their second homes on 
occasion during the week, on weekends, holidays, and summer 
vacations to claim it as a second primary residence? Such will 
have far reaching tax consequences in those jurisdictions. 
Certainly the Legislature never meant for such a misuse of its 
primary residential property tax exemption. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah State Legislature provided a primary residential 
property tax exemption to households within the State of Utah. 
The intent was that each household would be entitled to one 
exemption. 
The Utah Tax Commission has changed that intent by 
reinterpreting "domicile" and "household" in such a manner that a 
family who divides their time between two homes can claim two 
exemptions, instead of just one. In so doing, the Commission has 
suggested that a family can be multiple "households" under the 
law. 
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Appellant Summit County requests this Court to reinstate the 
intent of the Utah State Legislature granting one primary 
residential property tax exemption per family unit, which is by 
definition one household. 
DATED this Q ^ ^ day of September, 2 003 
I >L^^C^ 
David L. Thomas 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on the 0 ^ day of fi;Tl)bt^  2003, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant Summit County were mailed by first class mail, postage 
prepaid thereon, to: 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Attorney General 
Michelle Bush 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the Utah State Tax Commission 
160 E. 300 S., 5th Floor 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874 
Joseph E. Tesch 
Tesch Graham 
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ADDENDUM A 
59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property - Residential property. 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis 
of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law. 
(2) Beginning January 1, 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall be reduced by 45%, 
representing a residential exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah 
Constitution. 
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the residential exemption. 
Amended by Chapter 275, 1995 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 59_02004.ZIP 1,871 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this TitlejAll Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Friday, May 02, 2003 
ADDENDUM B 
59-2-102 (Superseded 01/01/04). Definitions. 
As used in this chapter and title: 
(1) "Aerial applicator" means aircraft or rotorcraft used exclusively for the purpose of engaging in 
dispensing activities directly affecting agriculture or horticulture with an airworthiness certificate from 
the Federal Aviation Administration certifying the aircraft or rotorcraft's use for agricultural and pest 
control purposes. 
(2) "Air charter service" means an air carrier operation which requires the customer to hire an entire 
aircraft rather than book passage in whatever capacity is available on a scheduled trip. 
(3) "Air contract service" means an air carrier operation available only to customers who engage the 
services of the carrier through a contractual agreement and excess capacity on any trip and is not 
available to the public at large. 
(4) "Aircraft" is as defined in Section 72-10-102. 
(5) "Airline" means any air carrier operating interstate routes on a scheduled basis which offers to fly 
passengers or cargo on the basis of available capacity on regularly scheduled routes. 
(6) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of property as assessed by the 
county assessor and the commission and may be maintained manually or as a computerized file as a 
consolidated record or as multiple records by type, classification, or categories. 
(7) "Certified revenue levy" means a property tax levy that provides the same amount of ad valorem 
property tax revenue as was collected for the prior year, plus new growth, but exclusive of revenue from 
collections from redemptions, interest, and penalties. 
(8) "County-assessed commercial vehicle" means: 
(a) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which is not apportioned under Section 41-la-301 
and is not operated interstate to transport the vehicle owner's goods or property in furtherance of the 
owner's commercial enterprise; 
(b) any passenger vehicle owned by a business and used by its employees for transportation as a 
company car or vanpool vehicle; and 
(c) vehicles which are: 
(i) especially constructed for towing or wrecking, and which are not otherwise used to transport 
goods, merchandise, or people for compensation; 
(ii) used or licensed as taxicabs or limousines; 
(iii) used as rental passenger cars, travel trailers, or motor homes; 
(iv) used or licensed in this state for use as ambulances or hearses; 
(v) especially designed and used for garbage and rubbish collection; or 
(vi) used exclusively to transport students or their instructors to or from any private, public, or 
religious school or school activities. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(b), for purposes of Section 59-2-801, "designated tax 
area" means a tax area created by the overlapping boundaries of only the following taxing entities: 
(i) a county; and 
(ii) a school district. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (9)(a), "designated tax area" includes a tax area created by the 
overlapping boundaries of: 
(i) the taxing entities described in Subsection (9)(a); and 
(ii) (A) a city or town if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection (9)(a) and the 
boundaries of the city or town are identical; or 
(B) a special service district if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection (9)(a) are 
located entirely within the special service district. 
(10) "Eligible judgment" means a final and unappealable judgment or order under Section 59-2-1330: 
(a) that became a final and unappealable judgment or order no more than 14 months prior to the day 
on which the notice required by Subsection 59-2-919(4) is required to be mailed; and 
(b) for which a taxing entity's share of the final and unappealable judgment or order is greater than or 
equal to the lesser of: 
(i) $5,000; or 
(ii) 2.5% of the total ad valorem property taxes collected by the taxing entity in the previous fiscal 
year. 
(11) (a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or any improvements to the 
property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong 
taxpayer by the assessing authority; 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply with 
the reporting requirements of this chapter; or 
(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete or 
erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer. 
(b) Property which is undervalued because of the use of a different valuation methodology or because 
of a different application of the same valuation methodology is not "escaped property." 
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable 
knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined using 
the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a 
reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question 
and the change would have an appreciable influence upon the value. 
(13) "Farm machinery and equipment," for purposes of the exemption provided under Section 59-2-
1101, means tractors, milking equipment and storage and cooling facilities, feed handling equipment, 
irrigation equipment, harvesters, choppers, grain drills and planters, tillage tools, scales, combines, 
spreaders, sprayers, haying equipment, and any other machinery or equipment used primarily for 
agricultural purposes; but does not include vehicles required to be registered with the Motor Vehicle 
Division or vehicles or other equipment used for business purposes other than farming. 
(14) "Geothermal fluid" means water in any form at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade 
naturally present in a geothermal system. 
(15) "Geothermal resource" means: 
(a) the natural heat of the earth at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade; and 
(b) the energy, in whatever form, including pressure, present in, resulting from, created by, or which 
may be extracted from that natural heat, directly or through a material medium. 
(16) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and 
improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been acquired to the land or not. 
(17) "Intangible property": 
(a) means property that is capable of private ownership separate from tangible property; and 
(b) includes: 
(i) moneys; 
(ii) credits; 
(iii) bonds; 
(iv) stocks; 
(v) representative property; 
(vi) franchises; 
(vii) licenses; 
(viii) trade names; 
(ix) copyrights; and 
(x) patents. 
(18) "Metalliferous minerals" includes gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, and uranium. 
(19) "Mine" means a natural deposit of either metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable mineral. 
(20) "Mining" means the process of producing, extracting, leaching, evaporating, or otherwise 
removing a mineral from a mine. 
(21) (a) "Mobile flight equipment" means tangible personal property that is: 
(i) owned or operated by an: 
(A) air charter service; 
(B) air contract service; or 
(C) airline; and 
(ii) (A) capable of flight; 
(B) attached to an aircraft that is capable of flight; or 
(C) contained in an aircraft that is capable of flight if the tangible personal property is intended to be 
used: 
(I) during multiple flights; 
(II) during a takeoff, flight, or landing; and 
(III) as a service provided by an air charter service, air contract service, or airline. 
(b) (i) "Mobile flight equipment" does not include a spare part other than a spare engine that is 
rotated: 
(A) at regular intervals; and 
(B) with an engine that is attached to the aircraft. 
(ii) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission 
may make rules defining the term "regular intervals." 
(22) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, oil, gas, coal, salts, sand, rock, 
gravel, and all carboniferous materials. 
(23) "Personal property" includes: 
(a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (24) which is the subject of ownership and not 
included within the meaning of the terms "real estate" and "improvements"; 
(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys; 
(c) bridges and ferries; and 
(d) livestock which, for the purposes of the exemption provided under Section 59-2-1112, means all 
domestic animals, honeybees, poultry, fur-bearing animals, and fish. 
(24) (a) "Property" means property that is subject to assessment and taxation according to its value, 
(b) "Property" does not include intangible property as defined in this section. 
(25) "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means the operating property of a railroad, gas 
corporation, oil or gas transportation or pipeline company, coal slurry pipeline company, electrical 
corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage corporation, or heat corporation where the company 
performs the service for, or delivers the commodity to, the public generally or companies serving the 
public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or an electrical corporation, where the gas or 
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or 
industrial use. Public utility also means the operating property of any entity or person defined under 
Section 54-2-1 except water corporations. 
(26) "Real estate or property" includes: 
(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land; 
(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all timber belonging to individuals or 
corporations growing or being on the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges 
appertaining to these; and 
(c) improvements. 
(27) "Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments under this chapter, 
means any property used for residential purposes as a primary residence. It does not include property 
used for transient residential use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
(28) For purposes of Subsection 59-2-801(1 )(e), "route miles" means the number of miles calculated 
by the commission that is: 
(a) measured in a straight line by the commission; and 
(b) equal to the distance between a geographical location that begins or ends: 
(i) at a boundary of the state; and 
(ii) where an aircraft: 
(A) takes off; or 
(B) lands. 
(29) (a) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" means: 
(i) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate or intrastate to transport 
passengers, freight, merchandise, or other property for hire; or 
(ii) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate and transports the vehicle 
owner's goods or property in furtherance of the owner's commercial enterprise. 
(b) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" does not include vehicles used for hire which are specified 
in Subsection (8)(c) as county-assessed commercial vehicles. 
(30) "Taxable value" means fair market value less any applicable reduction allowed for residential 
property under Section 59-2-103. 
(31) "Tax area" means a geographic area created by the overlapping boundaries of one or more 
taxing entities. 
(32) "Taxing entity" means any county, city, town, school district, special taxing district, or any other 
political subdivision of the state with the authority to levy a tax on property. 
(33) "Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes charged on property, as extended 
on the assessment roll and may be maintained on the same record or records as the assessment roll or 
may be maintained on a separate record properly indexed to the assessment roll. It includes tax books, 
tax lists, and other similar materials. 
Amended by Chapter 240, 2002 General Session 
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a) Multiply the Utah percent of system factor by the in-service rail cars in the fleet. 
b) Multiply the product obtained in F.l.a) by 50 percent. 
2. Calculate the number of fleet rail cars allocated to Utah under the t ime speed factor. The steps 
for this calculation are as follows. 
a) Divide the fleet's Utah car miles by the average rail car miles traveled in Utah per year. The 
Commission has determined that the average rail car miles traveled in Utah per year shall equal 
200,000 miles. 
b) Multiply the quotient obtained in F.2.a) by the percent of in-service rail cars in the fleet. 
c) Multiply the product obtained in F.2.b) by 50 percent. 
3. Add the number of fleet rail cars allocated to Utah under the Utah percent of system factor, 
calculated in F. l .b), and the number of fleet rail cars allocated to Utah under the time speed 
factor, calculated in F.2.c), and multiply that sum by the average market value per rail car. 
RS84~24P~50- A p p o r t i o n i n g t h e Utah P ropor t i on o f Commerc ia l A i r c r a f t Va lua t i ons 
Pursuan t t o Utah Code A n n , Sect ion 5 9 - 2 - 2 0 1 , 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Commercial air carrier" means any air charter service, air contract service or airline as defined 
by Section 59-2-102. 
2. "Ground t ime" means the t ime period beginning at the time an aircraft lands and ending at the 
time an aircraft takes off. 
B. The commission shall apportion to a tax area the assessment of the mobile fl ight equipment 
owned by a commercial air carrier in the proportion that the ground time in the tax area bears to 
the total ground time in the state. 
C. The provisions of this rule shall be implemented and become binding on taxpayers beginning 
with the 1999 calendar year. 
R884-24P-S2, Cr i te r ia f o r D e t e r m i n i n g Pr imary Residence Pu rsuan t t o U tah Code A n n . 
Sect ions 5 9 - 2 - 1 0 2 , 5 9 - 2 - 1 0 3 , and 5 9 - 2 - 1 0 3 , 5 , 
A. "Household" is as defined in Section 59-2-1202. 
B. "Primary residence" means the location where domicile has been established. 
C. Except as provided in D. and F.3., the residential exemption provided under Section 59-2- 103 
is limited to one primary residence per household. 
D. An owner of multiple properties may receive the residential exemption on all properties for 
which the property is the primary residence of the tenant. 
E. Factors or objective evidence determinative of domicile include: 
UT Admin Code R884-24P. Property Tax. 
1. whether or not the individual voted in the place he claims to be domiciled; 
2. the length of any continuous residency in the location claimed as domicile; 
3. the nature and quality of the living accommodations that an individual has in the location 
claimed as domicile as opposed to any other location; 
4. the presence of family members in a given location; 
5. the place of residency of the individual's spouse or the state of any divorce of the individual 
and his spouse; 
6. the physical location of the individual's place of business or sources of income; 
7. the use of local bank facilities or foreign bank institutions; 
8. the location of registration of vehicles, boats, and RVs; 
9. membership in clubs, churches, and other social organizations; 
10. the addresses used by the individual on such things as: 
a) telephone listings; 
b) mail; 
c) state and federal tax returns; 
d) listings in official government publications or other correspondence; 
e) driver's license; 
f) voter registration; and 
g) tax rolls; 
1 1 . location of public schools attended by the individual or the individual's dependents; 
12. the nature and payment of taxes in other states; 
13. declarations of the individual: 
a) communicated to third parties; 
b) contained in deeds; 
c) contained in insurance policies; 
d) contained in wills; 
e) contained in letters; 
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f) contained in registers; 
g) contained in mortgages; and 
h) contained in leases. 
14. the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location; 
15. any failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a resident; 
16. the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location; 
17. the acquisition of a new residence in a different location. 
F. Administration of the Residential Exemption. 
1. Except as provided in F.2., F.4., and F.5., the first one acre of land per residential unit shall 
receive the residential exemption. 
2. I f a parcel has high density multiple residential units, such as an apartment complex or a 
mobile home park, the amount of land, up to the first one acre per residential unit, eligible to 
receive the residential exemption shall be determined by the use of the land. Land actively used 
for residential purposes qualifies for the exemption. 
3. If the county assessor determines that a property under construction will qualify as a primary 
residence upon completion, the property shall qualify for the residential exemption while under 
construction. 
4. A property assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act shall receive the residential 
exemption only for the homesite. 
5. A property with multiple uses, such as residential and commercial, shall receive the residential 
exemption only for the percentage of the property that is used as a primary residence. 
6. If the county assessor determines that an unoccupied property will qualify as a primary 
residence when it is occupied, the property shall qualify for the residential exemption while 
unoccupied. 
7.a) An application for the residential exemption required by an ordinance enacted under Section 
59-2- 103.5 shall contain the following information for the specific property for which the 
exemption is requested: 
(1) the owner of record of the property; 
(2) the property parcel number; 
(3) the location of the property; 
(4) the basis of the owner's knowledge of the use of the property; 
(5) a description of the use of the property; 
UT Admin Code R884-24P. Property Tax. 
(6) evidence of the domicile of the inhabitants of the property; and 
(7) the signature of all owners of the property certifying that the property is residential property, 
b) The application under F.7.a) shall be: 
(1) on a form provided by the county; or 
(2) in a writing that contains all of the information listed in F.7.a). 
R884~24F~53» 2003 Va lua t ion Guides fo r Va lua t ion of Land Sub jec t t o the Farmland 
Assessment Act Pursuant to Utah Code A n n , Sect ion 5 9 - 2 - 5 1 5 . 
A. Each year the Property Tax Division shall update and publish schedules to determine the 
taxable value for land subject to the Farmland Assessment Act on a per acre basis. 
1. The schedules shall be based on the productivity of the various types of agricultural land as 
determined through crop budgets and net rents. 
2. Proposed schedules shall be transmitted by the Property Tax Division to county assessors for 
comment before adoption. 
3. County assessors may not deviate from the schedules. 
4. Not all types of agricultural land exist in every county. If no taxable value is shown for a 
particular county in one of the tables, that classification of agricultural land does not exist in that 
county. 
B, All property defined as farmland pursuant to Section 59-2- 501 shall be assessed on a per acre 
basis as follows: 
1. Irrigated farmland shall be assessed under the following classifications. 
a) Irrigated I. The following counties shall assess Irrigated I property based upon the per acre 
values listed below: 
TABLE 1 
Irrigated I 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
Box Elder 
Cache 
Carbon 
Davis 
Emery 
Iron 
Kane 
Millard 
Salt Lake 
Utah 
Washington 
Weber 
800 
650 
525 
775 
500 
800 
465 
780 
680 
725 
650 
760 
b) Irrigated I I . The following counties shall assess Irrigated I I property based upon the per acre 
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59-2-1202. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) (a) "Claimant" means a homeowner or renter who: 
(i) has filed a claim under this part; 
(ii) is domiciled in this state for the entire calendar year for which a claim for relief is filed under this 
part; and 
(iii) has reached the age of 65 prior to the close of that calendar year. 
(b) A surviving spouse, who otherwise qualifies under this section, is an eligible claimant regardless 
of age. 
(c) If two or more individuals of a household are able to meet the qualifications for a claimant, they 
may determine among them as to who the claimant shall be, but if they are unable to agree, the matter 
shall be referred to the county legislative body for a determination of the claimant of an owned residence 
and to the commission for a determination of the claimant of a rented residence. 
(2) (a) "Gross rent" means rental actually paid in cash or its equivalent solely for the right of 
occupancy, at arm's-length, of a residence, exclusive of charges for any utilities, services, furniture, 
furnishings, or personal appliances furnished by the landlord as a part of the rental agreement. 
(b) If a claimant occupies two or more residences in the year and does not own the residence as of the 
lien date, "gross rent" means the total rent paid for the residences during the one-year period for which 
the renter files a claim under this part. 
(3) "Homeowner's credit" means a credit against a claimant's property tax liability. 
(4) "Household" means the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its 
furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses. 
(5) "Household income" means all income received by all persons of a household in: 
(a) the calendar year preceding the calendar year in which property taxes are due; or 
(b) for purposes of the renter's credit authorized by this part, the year for which a claim is filed. 
(6) (a) (i) "Income" means the sum of: 
(A) federal adjusted gross income as defined in Section 62, Internal Revenue Code; and 
(B) all nontaxable income as defined in Subsection (6)(b). 
(ii) "Income" does not include: 
(A) aid, assistance, or contributions from a tax-exempt nongovernmental source; 
(B) surplus foods; 
(C) relief in kind supplied by a public or private agency; or 
(D) relief provided under this part, Section 59-2-1108, or Section 59-2-1109. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (6)(a)(i), "nontaxable income" means amounts excluded from 
adjusted gross income under the Internal Revenue Code, including: 
(i) capital gains; 
(ii) loss carry forwards claimed during the taxable year in which a claimant files for relief under this 
part, Section 59-2-1108, or Section 59-2-1109; 
(iii) depreciation claimed pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code by a claimant on the residence for 
which the claimant files for relief under this part, Section 59-2-1108, or Section 59-2-1109; 
(iv) support money received; 
(v) nontaxable strike benefits; 
(vi) cash public assistance or relief; 
(vii) the gross amount of a pension or annuity, including benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act 
of 1974, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 231 et seq., and veterans disability pensions; 
(viii) payments received under the Social Security Act; 
(ix) state unemployment insurance amounts; 
(x) nontaxable interest received from any source; 
(xi) workers' compensation; 
i age z u i J 
(xii) the gross amount of "loss of time" insurance; and 
(xiii) voluntary contributions to a tax-deferred retirement plan. 
(7) (a) "Property taxes accrued" means property taxes, exclusive of special assessments, delinquent 
interest, and charges for service, levied on a claimant's residence in this state. 
(b) For a mobile home, "property taxes accrued" includes taxes imposed on both the land upon which 
the home is situated and on the structure of the home itself, whether classified as real property or 
personal property taxes. 
(c) (i) Beginning on January 1, 1999, for a claimant who owns a residence, "property taxes accrued" 
are the property taxes described in Subsection (7)(a) levied for the calendar year on 35% of the fair 
market value of the residence as reflected on the assessment roll. 
(ii) The amount described in Subsection (7)(c)(i) constitutes: 
(A) a tax abatement for the poor in accordance with Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 3; and 
(B) the residential exemption provided for in Section 59-2-103. 
(d) (i) For purposes of this Subsection (7) property taxes accrued are levied on the lien date. 
(ii) If a claimant owns a residence on the lien date, property taxes accrued mean taxes levied on the 
lien date, even if that claimant does not own a residence for the entire year. 
(e) When a household owns and occupies two or more different residences in this state in the same 
calendar year, property taxes accrued shall relate only to the residence occupied on the lien date by the 
household as its principal place of residence. 
(f) (i) If a residence is an integral part of a large unit such as a farm or a multipurpose or 
multidwelling building, property taxes accrued shall be the same percentage of the total property taxes 
accrued as the value of the residence is of the total value. 
(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (7)(f), "unit" refers to the parcel of property covered by a single 
tax statement of which the residence is a part. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "rental assistance payment" means any payment that: 
(i) is made by a: 
(A) governmental entity; or 
(B) (I) charitable organization; or 
(II) religious organization; and 
(ii) is specifically designated for the payment of rent of a claimant: 
(A) for the calendar year for which the claimant seeks a renter's credit under this part; and 
(B) regardless of whether the payment is made to the: 
(I) claimant; or 
(II) landlord; and 
(b) in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission 
may make rules defining the terms: 
(i) "governmental entity"; 
(ii) "charitable organization"; or 
(iii) "religious organization." 
(9) (a) "Residence" means the dwelling, whether owned or rented, and so much of the land 
surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for use of the dwelling as a home, and 
may consist of a part of a multidwelling or multipurpose building and a part of the land upon which it is 
built and includes a mobile home or houseboat. 
(b) "Residence" does not include personal property such as furniture, furnishings, or appliances. 
(c) For purposes of this Subsection (9), "owned" includes a vendee in possession under a land 
contract or one or more joint tenants or tenants in common. 
Amended by Chapter 272, 2003 General Session 
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ADDENDUM E 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
BRADLEY & JELLIAN SCOTT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 014891 
Parcel Nos. STL-3-38 
Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2001 
Judge: Chapman 
Presiding: 
Kerry R. Chapman, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Mr. Bradley Scott 
Mr. Kraig Powell, Attorney 
For Respondent: Ms. Jami Brackin, Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Ms. Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor 
Mr. Steve Martin, Appraiser, Summit County Assessor's Office 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
February 25, 2003. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax 
Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The year in question is 2001, with a lien date of January 1, 2001. 
3. The subject is a residential property located at 8200 Royal St. in Park City, which 
is in the Stag Lodge development at Deer Valley. The fair market value of the subject for 2001 
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property tax purposes in not at issue. At issue is whether the subject qualifies for the 45% primary 
residential exemption from property taxes for the 2001 tax year. 
4. Bradley and Jillian Scott have owned the subject property since 1989. Prior to the 
summer of 1997, they and their four children lived in California and used the subject property as a 
vacation home. In 1997, Mr. Scott decided to retire from his company, sell his California home, and 
move his family to Utah. In the summer of 1997, Ms. Scott and the four children moved from 
California to the subject property. Mr. Scott remained in California until late 1998 to attend to 
business affairs, at which time he moved to Utah. 
5. In the autumn of 1997, the Scott children were enrolled at Rowland Hall, a 
private school located in Salt Lake City. For over a year, the children commuted to school from 
the subject property in Park City. In the spring of 1999, the Scotts purchased another home, 
located at 1101 N. Oak Forest Road in Salt Lake City (the "Salt Lake home"). Mr. Scott claimed 
that this home was purchased to accommodate the educational and social activities of the 
children, which primarily occurred in Salt Lake City, and to eliminate the burden of the commute 
from Park City. 
6. Mr. Scott testifies that the family calls the Salt Lake home the "school home" 
and that the entire family stays at the subject property in Park City on weekends and during 
school vacations. Otherwise, when school is in session, Ms. Scott and the children generally 
spend four nights a week at the Salt Lake home and three nights a week at the subject property. 
However, Mr. Scott generally spends five nights a week in Park City at the subject property and 
two nights a week at the Salt Lake home. 
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7. The Park City subject property and the Salt Lake home have approximately 
the same amount of square footage living area and both are fully famished. Both properties were 
assessed at relatively similar values for the 2001 tax year. 
8. In 2001, the Summit County assessor and the Salt Lake County assessor 
discussed whether both of the Scotts' Utah homes, i.e., the subject property and the Salt Lake 
home, qualified to receive the primary residential exemption. Both homes had received the 
primary residential exemption in the 2000 tax year. Based on the information available to the 
two county assessors, the Salt Lake County assessor decided that the Salt Lake home qualified 
for the exemption. For this reason, the Summit County assessor removed the exemption from the 
subject property so that the Scott "household" did not receive more than one primary residential 
exemption. The Summit County Board of Equalization sustained the assessor's action. 
9. Mr. Scott appealed Summit County's action aind asks the Tax Commission to 
reinstate the primary residential exemption on the subject property. Mr. Scott claims that his 
domicile is at the Park City home and, for this reason, the subject is a primary residence that 
qualifies for the exemption. He asks the Tax Commission to either find that he and his family 
have two "households," one being the subject property where he is domiciled and the other being 
the Salt Lake home where his wife and children are domiciled, or find that the family constitutes 
one "household" that is domiciled at the Park City subject property. In either circumstance, he 
contends, the subject property would be a primary residence entitled to the primary residential 
exemption. 
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10. The County asks the Commission to consider Mr. Scott and his family a 
single "household" for purposes of the primary residential exemption. The Respondent argues 
that if the Scott family is considered a single household, the preponderance of the evidence will 
show this household to have its domicile in Salt Lake City, not Park City, thereby disqualifying 
the subject property from the primary residential exemption. 
11. Both parties submitted various forms of evidence and testimony to show 
whether any person or persons were domiciled at the Park City subject property as of the lien 
date. Mr. Scott presented evidence that he and his wife listed the Park City subject property as 
their home address and mailing address on both their 2001 Federal Income Tax Return and 2001 
Utah Individual Income Tax Return, both of which they filed jointly. 
12. Evidence was also submitted showing that a 2001 Park City phone directory 
had a telephone listing for "Bradley Scott" that included the address of the subject property. 
While a Salt Lake City directory showed a 2001 telephone listing for Mr. Scott's office at 9 
Exchange Place in Salt Lake City, no listing could be found for the Salt Lake home. 
13. Mr. Scott also presented evidence that his Utah driver's license, which he 
obtained in early 1999, lists the Park City subject property as his address. To further prove he is 
domiciled in Park City, Mr. Scott presented a copy of his Park City Library card and evidence 
that he was president of the Stag Lodge Owners Association, where the subject property is 
located, in 2001. Mr. Scott also testified that he was a member of the Board of Trustees of the 
Summit Institute for the Arts in Park City in 2001 and that he was not a member or sponsor of 
any organization in Salt Lake City in 2001. 
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14. Mr. Scott testified that his wife and children are members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but that he is not. Although they do not regularly attend 
services, the family attends the Park City ward more often than one in Salt Lake City. Mr. Scott 
further testified that his family's church records are located at the ward in Park City and that the 
most recent baptism of one of the Scott children occurred at the Park City ward. 
15. None of the Scott children attend public school. They attend private school 
in Salt Lake City. Testimony also indicated that they participate on soccer teams in Salt Lake 
City. 
16. Mr. Scott announced as a candidate for mayor of Park City in March or April 
of 2001. He submitted campaign literature that was prepared prior to his renouncing his 
candidacy later that spring because his voting in Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election 
became an issue. Mr. Scott explained that he was registered to vote in Salt Lake City not by 
choice, but because of how he was instructed to complete his voter registration form. He stated 
that the form required a registrant to list a physical residence mailing address and specifically 
instructed the registrant not to list a post office box. Because mail is not delivered to the project 
in which the Park City subject property is located, Mr. Scott received mail at a Park City post 
office box in 2001. To comply with the voter registration form instructions, he entered the 
address of the Salt Lake home, the only physical residence mailing address he had. Mr. Scott 
stated that this action resulted in him being registered to vote in Salt Lake City, although he 
claimed Park City to be his home address. Nevertheless, Mr. Scott testified that he did vote in 
Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election and is still registered to vote in Salt Lake City. 
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17. Mr. Scott also testified that, since the summer of 1999, he has maintained an 
office at 9 Exchange Place in Salt Lake City. Mr. Scott, who is retired, stated that his 
investments are monitored at this office and that he does not operate any retail or other business 
from it. He employs a secretary and a controller who work at the office. Mr. Scott explained that 
he retained office space in this location partly for social reasons, because a Park City friend is the 
owner of the building, and his leasing office space there gave him an opportunity to lunch with 
and drive to the office with this fiiend. 
18. All bills are typically sent to the office at 9 Exchange Place in Salt Lake City 
for payment, where his controller is located. Mr. Scott stated that he continued a practice in Utah 
that had begun in California where he directed bills to be sent to the accountant for payment. 
However, Mr. Scott further testified that should an application ask for a home address, he would 
list the address of the Park City subject property in response. Mr. Scott further stated that all 
newspapers and magazines subscriptions are mailed to 9 Exchange Place in Salt Lake City and 
that a newspaper is not delivered to either home. Since September 2002, when Mr. Scott gave up 
his Park City post office box, all mail goes to the office at 9 Exchange Place, except for some 
cards and letters that are addressed to the Salt Lake home. 
19. Mr. Scott also testified that his only bank account is Utah is at Wells Fargo 
Bank in Salt Lake City. He stated that in 1997, he established a bank account at the Park City 
branch of Wells Fargo and established a banking relationship with private client services 
representative Darrin Burg. When the Park City branch closed in 1999 and Mr. Burg was 
transferred to a Salt Lake City office, Mr. Scott moved the account to the Salt Lake City branch 
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and continued the banking relationship with Mr. Burg. 
20. The Scott family owns or leases a number of motor vehicles. Mr. Scott testified 
that none of the family's vehicles are registered at the Salt Lake home. 2001 vehicle registration 
forms that Mr. Scott submitted show a number of vehicles registered at the Park City subject 
property address. Mr. Scott testified that the motor vehicles registered at the Park City subject 
property in 2001 included a Toyota 4Runner, a Dodge truck, a Mercedes Benz, a boat and a trailer. 
A number of other vehicles were registered at the 9 Exchange Place office in Salt Lake City, 
including an Audi, a BMW, a Ferrari, and a Bentley. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. At issue in this case is whether the Petitioners are entitled to receive the primary 
residential exemption on the subject property. Under Article XHI, Section 2(8) of the Utah 
Constitution, the "Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to exceed 
45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined by law[.]" The Legislature has 
exercised this power by enacting Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103(2), which requires that the fair market 
value of "residential property" be reduced 45%. 
2. For purposes of the 45% exemption, "residential property" is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. §59-2-102(27) as follows: 
"Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments 
under this chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a 
primary residence. It does not include property used for transient residential 
use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
- 7 -
Appeal No. 01-1891 
3. Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52 ("Rule 52") was promulgated to 
provide guidance in administering the 45% residential exemption on primary residences. 
Pertinent to the issue in this case are the following sections of Rule 52: 
A. "Household" is as defined in Section 59-2-1202. 
B. "Primary residence" means the location where domicile has been 
established. 
C. Except as provided in D. . . ., the residential exemption . . . is limited to 
one primary residence per household. 
4. To determine where "domicile has been established" for purposes of 
Section B., Section E. of Rule 52 provides a nonexclusive list of factors that are 
determinative of domicile, which include: 
1. whether or not the individual voted in the place he claims to be 
domiciled; 
2. the length of any continuous residency in the location claimed as 
domicile; 
3. the nature and quality of the living accommodations that an individual 
has in the location claimed as domicile as opposed to any other 
location; 
4. the presence of family members in a given location; 
5. the place of residency of the individual's spouse or the state of any 
divorce of the individual and his spouse; 
6. the physical location of the individual's place of business or sources of 
income; 
7. the use of local bank facilities or foreign bank institutions; 
8. the location of registration of vehicles, boats, and RVs; 
9. membership in clubs, churches, and other social organizations; 
10. the addresses used by the individual on such things as: a) telephone 
listings; b) mail; c) state and federal tax returns; d) listings in 
official government publications or other correspondence; e) driver's 
license; f) voter registration; and g) tax rolls; 
11. location of public schools attended by the individual or the individual's 
dependents; 
12. the nature and payment of taxes in other states; 
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13. declarations of the individual: a) communicated to third parties; b) 
contained in deeds; c) contained in insurance policies; d) contained 
in wills; e) contained in letters; f) contained in registers; g) 
contained in mortgages; and h) contained in leases. 
14. the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location; 
15. any failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a 
resident; 
16. the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location; 
17. the acquisition of a new residence in a different location. 
5. Section A. of Rule 52 provides that the definition of "household," as 
found in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1202, will also apply to the rule. "Household" is defined in 
Section 59-2-1202 as "the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its 
furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses." 
DISCUSSION 
As of the lien date, January 1, 2001, Mr. Scott claims to be domiciled at the 
Park City subject property. If the evidence and testimony show that he is domiciled at the 
subject property, this property is entitled to a primary residential exemption in accordance 
with Section B. of Rule 52, even should his wife and children be domiciled at the Salt Lake 
home. In prior decisions, the Commission has found that a couple who are domiciled at two 
separate locations are not considered to live in the same dwelling and, consequently, are not 
considered a "household," as defined in Section A. of Rule 52 and UCA §59-2-1201. Such 
couples would constitute two households, and the property where each is domiciled would 
qualify for the primary residential exemption. See Utah State Tax Comm fn Appeal No 02-
0598 (September 9, 2002) and Utah State Tax Comm 'n Appeal No. 02-1419 (January 22, 
2003). 
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Accordingly, if the Commission finds Mr. Scott to be domiciled at the Park 
City subject property, one of two scenarios exists. Either Mr. Scott is domiciled at the Park 
City subject property and his family is domiciled at the Salt Lake home, in which case they 
constitute two households, or the entire family is domiciled at and constitutes one household 
at the Park City subject property. In either case, the Park City subject property would be a 
primary residence entitled to the primary residential exemption. 
A variety of information and testimony was submitted to demonstrate where 
Mr. Scott was domiciled as of January 1, 2001. Mr. Scott testified that he has spent a 
majority of his time at the Park City home since moving there from California in 1998. He 
also stated that the family purchased the Salt Lake home primarily to accommodate the 
educational and social needs of the Scott children and that he still considered himself to be 
domiciled in Park City, even though his family spends a majority of their time at the Salt 
Lake home when school was in session. 
To further support his domicile being at the Park City home, Mr. Scott 
submitted evidence that he was a member of various organizations in the Park City area in 
2001 and that the only home telephone listing for him in 2001 is in the Park City telephone 
directory. In addition, he submitted documentation that shows him claiming the Park City 
subject property as his residence on several documents, including his driver's license, his 
2001 federal and state tax returns, and various motor vehicle purchase and registration 
documents. 
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As further evidence of domicile, Mr. Scott stated that, in early 2001, he 
announced his candidacy for mayor of Park City. Testimony from both parties and campaign 
materials submitted by Mr. Scott confirm his announced candidacy. 
Mr. Scott testified, however, that he renounced his candidacy for mayor of 
Park City once his voting in Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election became an issue. 
Ordinarily, the fact that Mr. Scott was registered to vote and voted in Salt Lake City would 
be a factor indicating his domicile to be in Salt Lake City. However, Mr. Scott explained 
that, per the voter registration form instructions, he felt he had to list the address of his Salt 
Lake home, not his Park City home, on his voter registration form. Based on this 
explanation, the Commission does not consider the fact that Mr. Scott registered to vote and 
did vote in Salt Lake City to weigh as heavily in our decision concerning his domicile as it 
would should the circumstances be different. 
Mr. Scott also has an office in Salt Lake City where his investments are 
monitored and his two employees work. While a person's place of business may often be 
located in the city of ones domicile, the Commission notes that Salt Lake City is a financial, 
governmental, and social hub for the state and is relatively close in proximity to Park City. 
For these reasons, it is reasonable to assume that many Park City domiciliaries work in Salt 
Lake City or routinely use the financial, medical, legal, and other services found in the Salt 
Lake City. The Commission also notes that a business offering goods or services to the 
public is not conducted from Mr. Scott's office and that Mr. Scott's presence is not 
necessarily required at the office on a full-time basis. Under the circumstances present in this 
- 1 1 -
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case, the Commission is not convinced that the location of Mr. Scott's office in Salt Lake 
City is a strong indication of his domicile. 
Mr. Scott5 s only bank account in Utah in located at a Salt Lake City branch of 
Wells Fargo. He opened the account at the Wells Fargo's Park City branch and, when that 
branch closed, transferred the account to a Salt Lake branch where his private client services 
representative was transferred. Often, the location of a bank account helps establish where a 
person is domiciled. However, due to the specific circumstances that led to Mr. Scott 
moving his account to a Salt Lake City branch, the Commission does not place much weight 
on this factor in its determination of Mr. Scott's domicile. 
Most of the mail received by the Scott family, including bills relating to both 
homes, is sent to Mr. Scott's office in Salt Lake City. Mr. Scott testified that the family had 
employed an accountant to pay bills prior to the family leaving California and continued that 
practice in Utah. Accordingly, the fact that most mail is sent to the office in Salt Lake City 
appears to relate more to Mr. Scott's accountant working in this location than to Mr. Scott's 
domicile. 
It is undeniable that Mr. Scott has a number of contacts with Salt Lake City. 
Nevertheless, a preponderance of the evidence and testimony submitted at the Formal 
Hearing suggests that Mr. Scott's domicile, for property tax purposes, was at the Park City 
subject property as of the lien date. Mr. Scott has claimed the Park City home to be his 
residence in numerous documents, including tax returns, vehicle registration documents, and 
driver's licenses. It is also logical to assume that Mr. Scott considered himself to be 
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domiciled in Park City in March 2001 when he declared his intent to run for mayor of Park 
City. The only organizations in Utah to which Mr. Scott belonged or in which he 
participated were located in Park City. There was no indication of involvement in Salt Lake 
City organizations. The family moved to the Park City subject property upon relocating to 
Utah from California, and Mr. Scott testified that since he moved, he spends a majority of 
time each year at the Park City subject property, not the Salt Lake home. 
Based on the totality of the evidence and testimony offered by both parties, 
the Commission finds that Mr. Scott was domiciled, for purposes of the primary residential 
exemption, at the Park City subject property as of the lien date, January 1, 2001. 
Accordingly, the subject property is a primary residence that is entitled to receive the primary 
residential exemption for the 2001 tax year. 
From the limited information provided about Ms. Scott and the Scott children, 
it is possible that their domicile was also at the Park City subject property as of the lien date. 
However, we need not make any determination about their domicile to issue a ruling in this 
matter and, consequently, decline to do so. The primary residential exemption of the Park 
City home is the only issue in this matter. Because we find the Park City home to be Mr. 
Scott's domicile for purposes of 2001 property taxes, it is a primary residence entitled to the 
primary residential exemption whether or not any other person is domiciled there. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
A preponderance of the evidence and testimony submitted at the Formal Hearing 
convinces the Commission that the subject property is entitled to the primary residential exemption 
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for the 2001 tax year. Accordingly, the Commission orders the county auditor to adjust its records 
and apply the primary residential exemption to the subject property for the tax year at issue. 
DATED this J-X day of '0?fe*/ , 2003. 
Kerry R. Cljapman 
Administrative Law Judge 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this
 4<?A day of 
ra^vv. 2LC*V^U*MJC 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
_, 2003. 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Bruce Johnson 
mmissioner 
bnson Marc B. Jo 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 63-46b-13. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If 
you do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final 
agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this 
order in accordance with Utah Code Ann.. 59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
KRC/01-1891.fof 
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Blake Frazier 
Summit County Auditor 
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Coalville, UT 84017 
Bradley Jillian Scott 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 922 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jami Brackin 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
PO Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Respondent 
Respondent 
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Attorney for Respondent 
Joseph E Tesch 
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Attorney for Petitioner 
**** CER TIFICA TION**** 
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ADDENDUM F 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
JUDY L. BLACK, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Initial Hearing Decision and Order 
Appeal No. 02-0598 
Parcel. No. 22-04-354-004 
Tax Type Property Tax 
Tax Year 2001 
Presiding: 
Kerry R. Chapman, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Ms. Judy Black, Property Owner 
Mr. John Forster, Property Owner 
For Respondent: Mr. Thomas Peters, Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan, Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Mr. Gary Lowe, Salt Lake County Assessor's Office 
Ms. Barbara Kessler, Summit County Assessor 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for an Initial Hearing pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 59-1-502.5, on August 14, 2002. Petitioner brings this 
appeal from a decision of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, which had confirmed the 
county assessor's removal of the residential exemption on a property at 4206 S. Stockbridge Lane 
("Salt Lake property") for the 2001 tax year. The Salt Lake property is owned by Ms. Judy Black 
and Mr. John Forster in joint tenancy. 
Prior to Salt Lake County removing the residential exemption on the Salt Lake property, 
the following events occurred. On July 14, 2000, Mr. Forster signed and submitted a Summit 
County Affidavit of Primary Residence to the Summit County assessor in order to receive a 
primary residential exemption on an Oakley, Utah cabin ("Summit property") that he and Ms. 
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Black own in joint tenancy. He was informed that Summit County would grant the exemption on 
the Summit property if Salt Lake County removed the exemption on the Salt Lake property. 
In a letter dated September 12, 2000 to Salt Lake County, Mr. Forster stated that he had 
changed his primary residence to Summit County and asked Salt Lake County to "remove my 
primary residence exemption" from the Salt Lake property so that Summit County would grant 
the exemption to the Summit property. He also stated in the letter that the Salt Lake property 
would continue to be the primary residence of Ms. Black. 
On October 6, 2000, Ms. Black signed a Salt Lake County Affidavit of Primary 
Residence stating that the Salt Lake property was her permanent, full-time residence and that she 
had no other full-time residence. 
In a letter dated March 22, 2001, Gary Lowe of the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office 
informed Summit County that Salt Lake County was removing the residential exemption on the 
Salt Lake property for 2001. Mr. Lowe stated that the exemption was being removed from the 
Salt Lake property because Mr. Forster and Ms. Black constituted a "household" and because the 
Summit County property would be receiving the residential exemption as per Mr. Forster's 
request. 
For the 2001 tax year, the Salt Lake property was taxed at 100%o of its assessed value; 
i.e., it did not receive the 45% residential exemption. Ms. Black appealed the 2001 assessment to 
the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, which denied her request to reinstate the exemption 
on the Salt Lake property, 
APPLICABLE LAW 
L Under Article XIII, Section 2(8) of the Utah Constitution, the "Legislature may 
provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to exceed 45%0 of the fair market value of 
residential property as defined by Iaw[.]" The Legislature has exercised this power by enacting 
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Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103(2), which requires that the fair market value of "residential property" 
be reduced 45%. 
2. For purposes of the 45% exemption, "residential property" is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §59-2-102(27) as follows: 
"Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and 
adjustments under this chapter, means any property used for residential 
purposes as a primary residence. It does not include property used for 
transient residential use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
3. Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52 ("Rule 52") was promulgated to 
provide guidance in administering the 45% residential exemption on primary residences. 
Pertinent to the issue in this case are the following sections of Rule 52: 
A. "Household" is as defined in Section 59-2-1202. 
B. "Primary residence" means the location where domicile has been 
established. 
C. Except as provided in D. . . ., the residential exemption . . . is limited 
to one primary residence per household. 
4. To determine where "domicile has been established" for purposes of 
Section B., Section E. of Rule 52 provides a nonexclusive list of factors that are 
determinative of domicile, which include: 
1. whether or not the individual voted in the place he claims to be 
domiciled; 
2. the length of any continuous residency in the location claimed as 
domicile; 
3. the nature and quality of the living accommodations that an 
individual has in the location claimed as domicile as opposed to 
any other location; 
4. the presence of family members in a given location; 
5. the place of residency of the individual's spouse or the state of any 
divorce of the individual and his spouse; 
6. the physical location of the individual's place of business or 
sources of income; 
7. the use of local bank facilities or foreign bank institutions; 
8. the location of registration of vehicles, boats, and RVs; 
9. membership in clubs, churches, and other social organizations; 
10. the addresses used by the individual on such things as: a) 
telephone listings; b) mail; c) state and federal tax returns; d) 
listings in official government publications or other 
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correspondence; e) driver's license; f) voter registration; and g) 
tax rolls; 
11. location of public school0 attended by the individual or the 
individual's dependents; 
•12. the nature and payment of taxes in other states; 
13. declarations of the individual: a) communicated to third parties; 
b) contained in deeds; c) contained in insurance policies; d) 
contained in wills; e) contained in letters; f) contained in 
registers; g) contained in mortgages; and h) contained in leases. 
14. the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location; 
15. any failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a 
resident; 
16. the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location; 
17. the acquisition of a new residence in a different location. 
5. Section A. of Rule 52 provides that the definition of "household," as 
found in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1202, will also apply to the rule. "Household" is defined 
in Section 59-2-1202 as "the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, 
sharing its furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses." 
DISCUSSION 
Ms. Black and Mr. Forster own two residential properties, the Salt Lake property 
and the Summit property, in joint tenancy. Although Ms. Black and Mr. Forster have 
keys and unlimited access to both properties, they claim that Ms. Black's "primary 
residence" is the Salt Lake property and Mr. Forster's "primary residence" is the Summit 
property. Accordingly, they assert that each is entitled to a primary residential 
exemption, one for the Salt Lake property and one for the Summit property. 
However, Respondent rejects this position, claiming that Ms. Black and Mr. 
Forster comprise one "household," as defined in Section 59-2-1202. As such, the 
Respondent asserts that Section C. of Rule 52 precludes Ms, Black and Mr. Forster, as a 
"household," from receiving more than one primary residential exemption. Respondent 
further states that because the "household" has already received a 2001 primary 
residential exemption on the Summit property, it may not receive another exemption for 
the Salt Lake property. 
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To determine whether the Salt lake property should receive a primary lesidential 
exemption, we must examine where Ms Black and Mr Forster are domiciled and if they 
compnse a "household" as defined m Section 59-2-1202 If they aie both domiciled at 
the same location and compnse a "household," then, subject to Section C of Rule 52, 
they may only receive one primary residential exemption On the other hand, for Ms 
Black and Mr Forster to each receive a primary residential exemption, they would need 
to show that they are domiciled at different locations and do not compnse a household 
Domicile and Household To determine if Ms Black and Mr Forster are 
considered one household for purposes of the pnmary residential exemption, we must 
first examine each of their domiciles to establish if they have primary residences m 
separate locations or not Petitioner asserts that Ms Black is domiciled at the Salt Lake 
property Respondent does not dispute this assertion Nor is there any evidence 
submitted to suggest that Ms Black's domicile is other than the Salt Lake property For 
these reasons, we determine that Ms Black is domiciled at the Salt Lake property, and m 
accordance with Section B of Rule 52, the Salt Lake property is Ms Black's primary 
residence 
Cntical to our determination, consequently, is whether Mr Forster is domiciled 
at the Salt Lake property or the Summit property A number of nonexclusive factors are 
listed m Section E of Rule 52 to assist in determining a property owner's domicile Mr 
Foister has claimed the Summit property to be his pnmary residence He has established 
that he is registered to vote m Summit County and that ths telephone listing at the 
Summit property is m his name Although the Summit property cannot be reached by car 
m the winter, Mr Forster has established that he has snowmobiles stored neared the 
property with which he can reach the home He states that most of his furniture is located 
at the Summit property, although he still has some items at the Salt Lake property Mr 
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Foistei pays all the utility payments at the Summit property, but none at the Salt Lake 
property Although these factois support Mr Forstei's claim that the Summit pioperty is 
his primary i esidence, additional factors suggest otherwise 
Mr Forster has not established that any mail is received at the Summit pioperty, 
such as utility bills, or that any of his vehicles or snowmobiles are registered with 
Summit County as their situs address In fact, all utility bills for the Summit property are 
received at his business that is located m Salt Lake County, which is also the address 
listed as the situs of his registered vehicles and snowmobiles On federal and state 
income tax returns where a home address is requested, Mr Forster does not indicate the 
Summit property as his home, but instead indicates the location of the Salt Lake County 
business as his home address Mr Foister has not established any barking relationship 
with a bank or branch near his home, but uses a bank near his business location m Salt 
Lake County Even his driver's license indicates his address to be m Salt Lake County at 
his place of business. 
In addition, the telephone number and address of the Salt Lake property is listed 
m the Salt Lake City telephone directory under Mr Forster's name Although Mr 
Forster claims to spend most nights at the Summit property, he states that he uses the Salt 
Lake property depending upon "what's going on" and if there are reasons to stay m Salt 
Lake City for the night He also pays half of the mortgage, property tax, and 
homeowner's insurance expenses on the Salt Lake property 
Given that the Summit property is only accessible m winter with snowmobiles, 
that it is significantly furthei away fiom Mr Forster's place of business than the Salt 
Lake property (especially relevant m bad weather), and that no other home m the Canyon 
Rim Ranch development (where the Summit propeity is located) is used as a primary 
residence, we are hesitant to accept that the Summit property is Mr Forstei's domicile 
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Had all the other facts and objective evidence discussed above clearly shown that 
Mr. Forster had changed his domicile to the Summit property, we would be more inclined 
to accept Mr. Forster's assertion that it is his primary residence. However, very few of 
these factors or objective criteria point to domicile at the Summit property. Most of the 
factors and criteria are either ambiguous because they point to a domicile at Mr. Forster's 
business address (which is closer in proximity to the Salt Lake property), while others 
point to a domicile at the Salt Lake property. For these reasons and based on the 
evidence submitted, we find that Mr. Forster is domiciled at the Salt Lake property for 
purposes of the primary residential exemption. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. 
Forster's domicile and primary residence is at the Salt Lake property, not the Summit 
property. 
Having concluded that Ms. Black and Mr. Forster are both domiciled at the Salt 
Lake property, it is apparent from the facts and testimony that they are a "household, 
which is defined in Section 59-2-1202 to be "the association of persons who live in the 
same dwelling, sharing its furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses." Ms. 
Black and Mr. Forster have had a relationship for at least ten years, during which time 
they have owned the Salt Lake property in joint tenancy. Each has a key and unlimited 
access to the Salt Lake property and equally divides the cost of the mortgage payments 
and property taxes on the property. Mr. Forster maintains a homeowner's policy that 
covers the Salt Lake property and states that he and Ms. Black equally divide the amount 
of the premium representing the Salt Lake property. In addition, both Ms. Black and Mr. 
Forster have tangible personal property at the Salt Lake property. While they may not 
share the utility bills or spend all nights together at the Salt Lake property, these limited 
facts do not overcome the majority of the evidence that establishes that Ms. Black and 
Mr. Forster are an "association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its 
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furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses " Accordingly, we find that they a 
"household," as defined m Section 59-2-1202, for purposes of Rule 52, and as such, are 
limited to one primary residential exemption 
Respondent asserts that Ms Black and Mr Forster constitute a "household" 
because they own their residences m joint tenancy and that such ownership confers an 
undivided interest m the properties to each of them We reject this argument Two 
persons may own a property m joint tenancy without automatically being a "household" 
as defined m Section 59-2-1202 That statute does not provide that a "household" is 
determined by commonality of ownership or sharing an undivided interest m property 
Instead, Section 1202 requires us to examine, as we have above, whether Ms Black and 
Mr Forster live m the same dwelling and share its accommodations, furnishings aid 
expenses 
Exemption We have determined that Ms Black and Mr Forster have the same 
domicile and are one "household " Accordingly, under these circumstances, they may 
receive only one primary residential exemption For the tax year 2001, they received a 
residential exemption on the Summit property, but not the Salt Lake property Which of 
their two properties is entitled to the primary residential exemption under Utah law and 
Rule 52, however, is an issue 
Ordinarily, when a household with two residences elects one as its primary 
residence for purposes of property tax, the election is unquestioned by the counties The 
property that is claimed to be the primary residence receives the exemption, the 
secondary residence does not However, m this case, Ms Black and Mi Forster, the 
household, claimed that both residences were primary residences The Respondent 
dismissed this claim by removing the exemption from the Salt Lake property When a 
county challenges the taxpayer's assertion of primary residence, we must determine, m 
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accordance with Sections 59-2403(2) and 59-2-102(27), whether or not a property is 
used ccfoi residential purposes as a pnmary residence" If it is used as a primary 
lesidence, it shall receive the exemption under Utah law Section E of Rule 52 provides 
that "pnmary residence" means the location wheie domicile has been established 
Accordingly, if a residential property is the location wheie domicile is established, it is a 
primary residence and shall receive the exemption 
We have determined that the Salt Lake property, the property at issue m this 
appeal, is the domicile of Ms Black and Mr Foistei Accordingly, this pioperty is their 
pnmary residence and qualifies for the primary residential exemption 
Although the taxation of the Summit property is not at issue m this appeal, we 
have determined that neither Ms Black nor Mr Forster is domiciled at that property 
Unless someone is domiciled at the Summit property, it would not be considered a 
primary residence that qualifies for the pnmary residential exemption Because Summit 
County's action to apply the primary residential exemption to the Summit property was a 
direct result of Mr Forster's Affidavit of Primary Residence, dated October 6, 2000, we 
are forwarding a copy of this order to Summit County so that it may make any 
investigation and adjustments it deems appropriate on the Summit property 
DECISION AND ORDER 
We find that Ms Black and Mr Forster are both domiciled at the Salt Lake property and 
constitute a household for purposes of administering the pnmary residential exemption 
Accoidmgly, the Salt Lake property is a primary residence that qualifies for the primary 
residential exemption for 2001 We grant Petitioner's request that the pnmary residential 
exemption be reinstated on the Salt Lake property and order Respondent to adjust its records 
accordingly It is so ordered 
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This decision does not limit a party's right to a Formal Hearing However, this Decision 
and Order will become final unless a paity to this case files a written request withm thirty (30) 
days of the date of this decision to pioceed to a Formal Hearing The written request must 
include the appeal number and the above captioned case name, as well as the Petitioner's name 
and address Such a request must be mailed to or deliveied to 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeals Division 
210 Noith 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
Failure to timely request a Formal Heanng will preclude any furthei appeal rights m this 
matter 
DATED this / day of Q ^ ^ ^ y ^ ^ e ^ ^ , 2002 
i<t.{XL 
^erry R Cnapman 
Administrative Law Judge 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The undersigned Commissioners have reviewed this matter and concur m this decision 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
i 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
< 0 > ^ % \ R B r u c e Johnson/ / 
CO 2 ^ ^ . . W 
Commissioner 
Maic B Mraison 
Commissioner 
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Craig B. Sorensen 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State N3300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Respondent 
Judy Black 
4602 S Stockbndge Ln 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Petitioner 
Lee A. Gardner 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State N2300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Respondent 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Response October 16, 1997 
REQUEST LETTER 
September 17, 1997 
Re: Advisory Opinion - Primary Residential Exemption 
Dear Honorable Commissioners: 
There are questions that need clarifications concerning the application of the primary residential 
exemptions as allowed at UCA 59-2-103(2). 
Is the exemption applied in any case where the residence as unoccupied as of-the lien date of January 
first? Specifically, would the exemption apply to any uncompleted residence still unoccupied as of 
January 1 st, but moved into later in the tax year? 
Also in the case where a residence was occupied on January 1 st but vacated during the tax year, would 
the exemption be disallowed? 
I believe this is an area that needs clarification in that there are variations of the above scenarios 
being used by assessors throughout the state. I can be reached at #####, should you require further 
information. 
Respectfully yours, 
NAME 
RESPONSE LETTER 
October 16, 1997 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP 
Dear NAME, 
We have received your request for property tax guidance pertaining to the primary residential 
exemption. We offer the following: 
Property that is eligible for the primary residential exemption on the lien date is entitled to the 
exemption, even if the property is temporarily unoccupied. For example, assume that a home was sold 
prior to the lien and the seller moved out prior to the lien date. Assume also that the new owner does not 
move in until after January 1st. So long as the properly use meets the criteria for the primary residential 
exemption, the fact that it was temporarily unoccupied on January 1st is irrelevant. This situation may 
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also arise with rental property that serves as the primary residence of the tenants. The fact that the 
property may be temporarily vacant on the lien date should not defeat the exemption. 
Another example of a primary residential property that may be unoccupied on the lien date is a 
home under construction. It is our position that when property is committed to a qualifying use, that 
property is eligible for the exemption if (1) the dwelling is under construction on the lien date, (2) the 
assessor has evidence that the house is being constructed for use as a qualifying residential dwelling, and 
(3) the properly is actually put to use as a primary residential property upon completion during the tax 
year. If all of those conditions are met, the exemption relates back to the lien date. This is true even if 
the owner is living in another primary residence during construction. The primary exemption is based 
on the intended use of the two residences, not the occupants. 
The only distinctions that we have drawn with regard to a property owner who owns two homes 
in Utah are as follows: 
(1) If the property owner is a Utah resident, but neither of the homes is rented or leased for use 
as a primary residence of another party. In that case, we assume that the owner is using one home as a 
primary residence and the other as a secondary residence. 
(2) If the property owner is not a Utah resident, but owns residential property in Utah, we assume 
that the owner is using the Utah property as secondary property unless the owner shows that it is being 
used as a primary residence. (See Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 1997), copy enclosed.) 
Please let us know if we can be of further assistance. 
For the Commission, 
Joe B. Pacheco, 
Commissioner 
ADDENDUM H 
3EF0RE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
RUSSELL J. HADLEY, ) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER 
v. ) Appeal No. 94-2128 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ) Serial No. SG-CVTH-4-103 
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Tax Type: Property 
Resuondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a 
Telephone Settlement Conference pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-502.5, on May 17, 1995. Commissioner W. Val 
Oveson, presiding, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission, Present and representing Petitioner by telephone was 
Russell J. Hadley. Present and representing Respondent by 
telephone were Clint Perkins, Washington County Assessor, Art 
Partridge, Appraiser, and David Miller, Appraiser. 
Petitioner applied for primary residential property status for 
a twin home condominium located at 1843 West 950 North, St* George, 
Utah. Petitioner was denied primary residential property status by 
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the County Assessor. Petitioner appealed the decision cf the 
County Assessor :o the County Board of Equalization (Respondent). 
Respondent denied Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner appealed to the 
State Board of Equalization (State Tax Commission). 
FACTS 
1. The value cf tne St. George property is not disputed. 
2. Petitioner nolds title to the St. George property with his 
wife, as ]omt tenants in common. 
3 . Petitioner is also an owner of a duplex at 843 West 950 
North, Salt LaKe City, Utan. Petitioner holds title to the Salt 
Lake City property with his wife, as joint tenants in common. 
4. Petitioner married his current wife m recent years. Both 
had grown children from previous marriages Petitioner's cmldren 
live in various parts of the Country and he spends much of the year 
visiting his children outside of Utah. 
5. Petitioner spends approximately six months of the year 
living at his home m Washington County. Petitioner spends more 
time m Washington County than in any other location. 
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6 . Petitioner is a practicing attorney in Salt Lake County but 
has reduced his involvement in the practice in recent years and 
sold much of his interest to his son. Petitioner's reduced 
involvement in the practice has allowed travel to other parts of 
the county to visit his children and to spend more time in 
Washington County. 
7. Petitioner's wife spends most of her time at the Salt Lake 
City residence. Most of her friends are in Salt Lake County and 
she enjoys bridge with her friends. 
8. Petitioner files joint tax returns with his wife with the 
Internal Revenue Service and the State Tax Commission. 
9. Petitioner is registered to vote in Washington County and 
his wife is registered to vote in Salt Lake County. 
10. Petitioner and his wife have arranged their wills in such 
a way that will allow the St. George property to be distributed to 
Petitioner's children and Petitioner's wife's property in Salt Lake 
to be distributed to her children. 
11. Petitioner's driver's license uses the address of the Salt 
Lake residence. 
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12. Petitioner registers his automobile in Salt Lake County. 
13. Petitioner is a member of a Country Club in Washington 
County and golfs frequently with his friends. 
14. Petitioner seeks reversal of Respondents denial of primary 
residential property status of the subject property. 
APPLICABLE LftW 
Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution allows a 
reduction of the assessed valuation on residential property as may 
be established by the legislature by statute. Section 59-2-103(2) 
of the Utah Code provides for reduction of 3 2% of the fair market 
value on residential property. The statute further clarifies in 
Section 59-2-103: 
1) All tangible taxable property shall be 
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January l, unless otherwise provided 
by law. 
(2) Beginning January 1, 1994, the fair 
market value of residential property shall be 
reduced by 32%, representing a residential 
exemption allowed under Article XIII, Sec. 2 
Utah Constitution. 
-4-
Aooeai ITo. 34-2128 
(3) No ^ore than one acre of land per 
residential unit may qualify for the 
residential exemption. 
In section E3-2-102 the code further clarifies the issue with 
definitions of "Residential Property" as follows: 
"Residential property," for the purposes of 
the reductions and adjustments under this 
chapter, means any property used for 
residential purposes as a primary residence. 
It does not include property used for 
transient residential use cr condominiums used 
in rental pools. 
The Commission has adopted Standards of Practice to assist the 
County Assessors to administer the Property Tax laws. Standard 
number 12, as part of the Utah Property Tax Administration 
Standards of Practice, provides: 
4) Where a person or persons own more than 
one residence in Utah, none of which are used 
as rental property, only one of the residences 
may qualify as a primary residence. Only the 
residence which is occupied more than six 
months out of the year qualifies for the 
exemption. 
That same Standard of Practice also provides: 
2) A primary residence is that place where an 
individual has a true, fixed, permanent home 
to which place the individual has the 
intention of returning. A place which a 
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person nas voluntarily fixed as his/her 
haoitaticn not for a mere special or 
temporary purpose but with the intention of 
maKing a permanent home. 
3) If a person requests a property be 
designated as a primary residence, the 
exemption should not be granted without 
conclusive evidence that the property serves 
as the person's primary residence. If the 
person's address en the Utan driver's license 
and/or voter registration is m a county 
different from that of the property location 
address, the county where the application is 
made should notify the other county assessor. 
ANALYSIS 
The Commission interrupts the language of Utah Code §59-2-
103(3) to limit the residential exemption to only one primary 
residence per household. The taxpayer's primary residence, and 
only that residence, shall receive the 32% reduction for 
residential exemption which is allowed under Article XIII, section 
2 of the Utah Constitution. 
The primary residence of the taxpayer is described as a 
permanent full time residence. Further, it is the residence where 
the taxpayer or his family resides and is a true fixed permanent 
home and principal establishment. The more common factors or 
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oDiec::ve evidence of the existence of a person's place of 
residence or domicile include the following: 
1. Whether or not the person voted m the 
place //here the individual claims to be 
domiciled. Whittell v. Franchise Tax Board 231 
Call. App.2d 278 , 41 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Cali. 
19 N . 
2. The lengtn of any continuous residency m 
the state of domicile. 71 A. Jur.2d State and 
UQZZJ ^ x a t ^ n §570. 
3 . The nature and quality of the living 
accommodations that a person has in the place 
of domicile as opposed to any other location. 
4. The presence of family members in a given 
location. Peff v. Peff 2 NJ t!3, 67 A.2d 161 
(NJ 1949). 
5. The place of residency of the individual's 
spouse cr the state of any divorce of the 
person and his spouse. 
G. The physical location of the individual's 
place of business or sources of income. 
Chappgll v, Chappell 298 P.2d 768, 58 ALR.2d 
1214 (Okla. 1956) . 
7. The use of local bank facilities or foreign 
bank institutions. 
8. The registration of vehicles, boats, and 
RVs at a given place or state. 
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9. Membership m clubs, churches, and other 
social organizations. 
10. The addresses used by the individual as 
indicating his place of domicile on sucn 
thinas as i 
a. Telephone listings, 
b. Mail, 
c. State and Federal tax returns, 
d. listings in official government: 
publications or other 
correspondence, 
e. Driver's license, 
f. Voter registration,, and 
g. Tax rolls. 
11. Use of local public schools by the 
individual or his or her dependents. 
12. The nature and payment of taxes in other 
states. 
13 . Declarations of the individual 
communicated to: 
a. Third parties, 
b. Contained in deeds, 
c. Contained in insurance policies, 
d. Contained in Wills, 
e. Contained in letters, 
f. Contained in registrars, 
g. Contained in mortgages, and 
h. Contained in leasees. 
14. The exercise of civil or political rights 
in a given location. 
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15 . Any failure to obtain permits and licenses 
normally required of a resident. Elwert: 
v. Elwert 196 Oreg. 256, 248 P.2d 847, 36 
ALR.2d 741 (Oreg. 1952) . 
16. The purchase of a burial plot in a 
particular place. 
17. The acquisition of a new residence in a 
different location. Gardner ^. Gardner 
118 Ut. 496, 222 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1950). 
Webster*s Mew Collegiate Dictionary. 1973, defines primary as: 
1. a: first in order of time or development... 
2. a: of first rank, importance, or value: 
Principal... 
Webster's Mew Collegiate Dictionary, 1973, defines Residency 
as: 
1. a: the act or fact of dwelling in a place 
for some time b: the act or fact of living or 
regularly staying at or in some place for the 
discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a 
benefit 2. a (1): the place where one actually 
lives as distinguished from his domicile or a 
place of temporary sojourn (2) : DOMICILE 2a b: 
the place where a corporation is actually or 
officially established c: the status of a 
legal resident 
It is clear from these two definitions that a tax payer would 
be precluded from having more than one primary residence. 
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The Commission recommends that property owners declare their 
primary residence, and make declarations to each county assessor 
where there is more than one residence involved. In some counties, 
assessors have required the signing of an Affidavit of Primary 
Residence which has met with the approval of the Commission. 
In the instant case Petitioner seeks to divide the primary 
residential property characteristics between a husband and wife. 
This practice would allow a husband and wife to have separate 
primary residences and thwart the intent of statute. 
While there is undisputed testimony in this case that 
Petitioner meets many of the characteristics of a person living 
apart from their spouse, namely: 
I. Petitioner is Living in Washington County for at least six 
months, while Petitioner's wife lives in Salt Lake County most of 
the time.1 
Petitioner did not present evidence as to how much time his 
wife spent in St. George or in other places in the country. It 
was suggested that she played bridge with her friends in Salt 
Lakef but the approximate amount of time was not mentioned. 
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2. Peticioner is registered to vote m Washington County while 
Petitioner's wife is registered to vote m Salt Lake County. 
3. 3oth Petitioner and his wife have arranged their wills to 
transfer the property to children and not the spouse. 
4. Petitioner is a member of a Country Club in Washington 
County. 
There are other important characteristics of a person living 
apart from their spouse that are not met, namely: 
1. The Petitioner and his wife are married. 
2. Ownership of both properties are in joint tenancy. 
3. Petitioner nas filed tax returns jointly, with his wife, 
listing Salt Lake City as the primary residence. 
4. Petitioner's drivers license indicates that Salt Lake City 
is the primary residence. 
5. Petitioner's motor vehicle registration indicate that Salt 
Lake City is the primary residence. 
It is the finding of the Commission that the controlling 
factor in this case is the fact that the Petitioner is married. The 
law allows one primary residence per household and as long as a 
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taxpayer is carried that taxpayer can have tnly one primary 
residence in this state. 
Petitioner could choose to designate either the St. George or 
Salt Lake City residences as the primary residence, but not both. 
DECISION ANP ORDER 
Based upon the information presented at the conference, the 
decision of the Washington County Board of Equalization to deny 
the primary residential exemption to the subject property is 
affirmed. It is so ordered. 
This decision does not limit a party's right to a formal 
hearing. However, this Decision and Order will become the Final 
Decision and Order of the Commission unless any party to this case 
files a written request within thirty (30) days of the date of this 
decision to proceed to a Formal Hearing. Such a request shall be 
mailed to the address listed below and must include the 
Petitioner's name, address, and appeal number: 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeals Division 
210 North 1950 West: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
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Failure co request a Formal Hearing will preclude any further 
administrative action or appeal rights in this matter. 
DATED this lC day of ™aij 1995. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
-A/aJU^ 
W. Val Oveson 
Chairman 
ABSENT 
Roger 0. Tew 
Commissioner 
J6e B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
AVO/94-2T2e.SCO 
<U- SJu OJilt/ 
Alice Shearer 
Commissioner 
r A ^ . . . «... ; 
JSEALJ 
>• !l 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the forgoing document 
to the following: 
RUSSELL J HADLEY 
1843 W 950 NORTH 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
CALVIN R ROBISON 
WASHINGTON COUNTY AUDITOR 
197 EAST TABERNACLE 
DATED this JS~ 
CLINTON D PERKINS 
WASHINGTON COUNTY ASSESSOR 
197 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
dav of flku 1995 
(jifrO U 
Secretary 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify chat Z mailed a copy of the forgoing document 
to che following: 
RUSSELL J HADLEY 
1843 W 950 NORTH 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
CALVIN R ROBISON 
WASHINGTON COUNTY AUDITOR 
197 EAST TABERNACLE 
DATED this J 5 
CLINTON D PERKINS 
WASHINGTON COUNTY ASSESSOR 
197 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
day of % . 1995 
tf&o & 
Secrecary 
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